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ARGUMENT
Appellees' Brief raises five main issues, all of which
are questions of law:

(1)

whether the Foil legal injury test

requires only awareness of temporary symptoms; (2) whether the Foil
legal injury test requires knowledge of the likely or probable
cause of the injury; (3) whether the Foil test requires that a
plaintiff

know the possibility of negligence;

(4) whether the

continuing treatment doctrine adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in
Peteler v. Robison, 17 P.2d 244 (Utah 1932) was abrogated by §7814-4; and (5) whether the unique facts of this case require this
Court

to

recognize

the

exception to §78-14-4.

continuing

treatment

doctrine

as

an

Issues 1, 2, and 4 and 5 have not been

previously addressed by this Court or the Supreme Court.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
THE FOIL LEGAL INJURY TEST.
In Foil v. Ballinaer, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979) the

Utah Supreme Court reasoned that the term "injury" in §78-14-4
means "legal injury".

The statutory period does not begin to run

until discovery of "facts that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that he may have a cause of action against the health care
provider."
1984).

Haraett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152, 155 (D. Utah

Knowledge of a cause of action, requires knowledge of "[1]

the existence of an injury, [2] its cause, and [3] the possibility
of negligence."

Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 155.

The following will

show the Trial Court improperly applied the Foil test, basing its
decision entirely on the first prong, only incompletely on the
second prong and failed to address the third prong at all.
1

1. The Foil Legal Injury Test Is Not Satisfied
By Mere Awareness Of A Temporary Injury.
Appellees suggest that the Trial Court properly found
that knowledge of a temporary injury alone "is sufficient to start
the statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions." Brief
of Appellees, p. 39.

Contrary to Appellees' claims, cases

subsequent to Foil have never held that the legal injury test is
satisfied by showing only a plaintiff's knowledge of temporary
symptoms or dysfunctions.

The cases have consistently recognized

Foil's requirement that the action accrues only after knowledge of
injury,

whether

negligence".

temporary

or

permanent,

"resulting

from

Duerden v. Utah Valley Hospital, 663 F. Supp. 781,

785 (D. Utah 1987)(although plaintiff believed the injury to be
temporary,

she

knew

the

injury

"resulted

from

negligent

treatment")(emphasis added); Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates/
773 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah App. 1989) (plaintiff knew "that he had
sustained an injury and that the injury was caused by negligent
action.")(emphasis added); Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 475
(Utah App. 1989) (plaintiff "knew or should have known more than
two years before she filed this action that her mother's death was
the result of the health care providers' negligence")(emphasis
added).
Therefore, as a matter of law, knowledge of legal injury,
and

not

mere

knowledge

of

physical

injury,

must

still

be

established to trigger the statute of limitations under the case
law subsequent to Foil.

Foil, 601 P. 2d at 148.
2

Insofar as the

Trial Court based its decision solely on evidence that Jones was
aware of a physical injury more than two years before the filing of
his complaint, it erred and reversal is warranted.
Other courts have recognized the soundness of Foil's
requirement that a plaintiff be aware of the full nature and extent
of injury before the statute can accrue.

See Foil, 601 P.2d at

147; Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731, 735 (10th Cir. 1980);
Massey v. Litton, 669 P.2d 248, 251 (Nev. 1983); Burns v. Hartford
Hospital, 472 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Conn. 1984); Cleveland v. Wong, 701
P.2d 1301, 1306 (Kan. 1985) (statute of limitations did not run
even though the plaintiff knew that he was both incontinent and
impotent

immediately

after

surgery

but

was

advised

physicians that these conditions were temporary)-

by

his

If> in fact,

subsequent courts have deviated from Foil, as Appellees argue, by
permitting the statute to accrue with mere knowledge of a physical
injury, reversal of the trend to erode Foil is warranted.

2.

The Foil Legal Injury Test Requires That A Plaintiff Know The
True Cause Or The Likely Cause Of The Injury.
The Trial Court found that the statute in this case began

to run when Jones knew that the second surgery was "a" possible
cause of his injuries.

Pleadings

(hereinafter "PL."), at 1085

(Findings of Fact 516); PL. at 1087 (Conclusions of Law 53); PL. at
1048 (Court's Decision).

However, the second prong of the Foil

legal injury test has been interpreted to require existence of an
injury and knowledge of

,f

its cause". Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 155.

See also Hamilton v. Smith, 773 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1985).
3

To

have knowledge of "its" cause, a plaintiff must have knowledge of
the true cause of the injury; this refers to the act of the
defendant which gave rise to the injury.

Christiansen v. Rees, 436

P. 2d 435, 436 (Utah 1969); Foil, 601 P. 2d at 147.

Applying the

similar inquiry of knowledge of causation under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), Judge Richard Posner has stated:

"When there

are two causes of an injury/ and only one is the government, the
knowledge

that is required to

set the statute of

limitations

running is knowledge of the government cause, not just the other
cause."

Drazan v. United States, 762 F.2d 56, 59 (7th Cir. 1985);

See also Arvayo v. United States, 766 F.2d 1416, 1420 (10th Cir.
1985).

The United States Supreme Court holds that a plaintiff be

"in possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt and who
has inflicted the injury" for a claim to accrue under the FTCA.
United
added).

States v. Kubrick,

444 U.S.

Ill, 122

(1979)

(emphasis

See also Imes v. Tourma, 784 F.2d 756, 758 (6th Cir.

1986); Williams, 637 F.2d at 735.
In

cases

of

multiple

possible

causes,

it

has

been

recognized that knowledge of causation requires that a plaintiff
know the "likely or probable" cause of the injury/ not just a
possible cause.

Rosales v. United States, 824 F.2d 779, 805 (9th

Cir. 1987); Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181,
1183 (Utah 1989)(plaintiff knew that her injuries "were most likely
caused" by oxygen deprivation); Maughan v. S. W. Servicing, Inc.,
758 F.2d 1381, 1387 (10th Cir. 1985) (in cases involving multiple
causes, the statute must be tolled until the plaintiff knows or
4

should know that one particular source was likely the cause of the
injury); Mendez by Martinez v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 701, 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (plaintiff's knowledge that the medical cause of
newborn's injury was "possibly lack of oxygen to the brain" did not
cause claim to accrue); Lee v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 883, 886
(E.D.N.Y. 1980); Hance v. United States, 773 F. Supp. 531 (W.D.N.Y.
1991).
The only finding by the Trial Court on this issue was
that Jones knew that the surgery had not been ruled out as a
possible cause of the injury.

PL. 1048-49.

However, there is no

evidence that Jones' knew that surgery was "the (cause) or (the)
likely cause" of his sexual dysfunctions.

TR. at 1235 lines 4-15

(testimony of Dr. BeckerJ.1
1

Dr. Becker had not been able to diagnose the cause or the
likely cause of Jones' sexual disabilities. TR. 1189 lines 9-25,
at 1190 lines 1-2 (testimony of Dr. Becker). In response to what
the cause of Jones' sexual dysfunction is Dr. Becker replied: "I'm
not sure. Based on all the tests and what has happened and so
forth, and the number of people who have seen him and consulted on
the problem, I think it's still very unclear." TR. at 1235 lines
23-25, at 1236 lines 1-3. Dr. Becker's letter of May 29, 1984, to
Dr. Richard Middleton, stated:
"I explained [to Jones] that no
true case of impotence had been reported with the mucosal
proctectomy and ileoanal pull-through procedure.
In fact, the
operation is performed anatomically such that it is almost
impossible to damage the parasympathetic nerves to the penis or to
totally destroy the sympathetic innervation." Plaintiff's exhibit
no. 4.
Dr. Becker told Jones that the cause of his sexual
dysfunctions was "unlikely related" to the surgery. TR. at 1196
lines 19-25, at 1197 lines 1-2, at 1234 lines 7-12 (testimony of
Dr. Becker). Jones was also informed by University Hospital and
other physicians that it was "highly unlikely" that surgery was the
cause of his sexual dysfunctions. TR. at 1653 lines 1-25, at 1654
lines 1-17, at 1657 lines 1-2, at 1659 lines 17-20 (testimony of
Dr. Middleton); TR. at 1373 lines 11-21, at 1383 lines 5-15
(testimony of Dr. Mangelson). The District Court also found that
Jones' sexual dysfunctions were "unlikely to be the result of
surgery." PL. at 1050-51 (Court's Decision).
5

Jones was referred to numerous other doctors about his
condition

based

on

numerous

other

possible

causes

of

his

dysfunction. Finally, in September of 1987, Dr. Dayton told Jones
that the "most likely cause" of his sexual dysfunctions was that
"something went wrong during the surgeries". TR. at 1449 lines 1825, at 1450 lines 12-14 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). This is the
only evidence offered which indicates that anyone told Jones that
the surgery was the likely or probable cause of his injuries.
Finding knowledge of causation because Jones made a connection
between the surgery and his injury improperly bases knowledge on
mere layman's speculation.

Foil explained, "common experience

teaches that one often suffers pain and other physical difficulties
without suspecting the true cause, and may, as often happens,
ascribe a totally erroneous cause to the manifestations. Foil, 601
P.2d at 144; See Chamness v. United States, 835 F.2d 1350, 1353
(11th Cir. 1988); Reis v. Cox, 660 P.2d 46, 50 (Idaho 1982).
Therefore, Jones actually had no facts upon which to base a
knowledge that the surgery was the likely cause of his injuries.
Appellees argue that Jones knew the cause of his injuries
because he allegedly threatened to sue the University Hospital.
Appellees Brief at p. 29-30, Findings of Fact 520, Transcript
(hereinafter "TR.") at 1086.

This assertion is contrary to the

great weight of the evidence. Jones not only strongly denied this
assertion,

TR. at 1319 lines 3-5, at 1320 lines 5-7,

but

explained that any threats, if they existed, were directed toward
the impersonal way he was treated as an individual at the Hospital.
6

TR. at 1314a lines 21-23 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones).

Dr. Harmon

also testified Jones was angry because the Appellees failed to
return his phone calls and failed to respond to his questions.

TR.

at 1634 lines 11-21, at 1642 lines 8-15 (testimony of Dr. Harmon).
Even Terri Stoker, the person upon whose testimony Appellees rely
for this assertion, testified that Jones' litigation threats were
related to "his dissatisfaction with how he's being treated by the
secretary/receptionist and others."

TR. at 1581 lines 4-8.

When

the Stoker testimony is read in context, it is clear that Jones'
complaints were directed to the bedside manner of the University
and the red tape he confronted.2
(testimony

of Terri

Stoker).

See TR. at pages

1579-1584

A patient's complaints about

a

doctor's bedside manner is insufficient to start the statute of
limitations in a claim of malpractice.

Rispoli v. United States,

576 F. Supp. 1401, 1402 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
Finally it is axiomatic that a patient cannot be expected
to discover the medical cause of his injuries "before the doctors
themselves are able to do so."

Rosales v. United States, 824 F.2d

799, 805 (9th Cir. 1987); Chamness v. United States, 835 F.2d 1350,
1353 (11th Cir. 1988).

Further complicating matters, in this case,

the Trial Court found, as a matter of fact, that Jones had suffered
no injury as a result of the surgeries.
Court wrote:

In its decision the Trial

"[I]n the instant case there still appears to be a

^The Memo to which Appellees refer is an unsigned, undated
memo that was not included in Appellees' production of documents in
response to Jones' Motion to Compel hospital files.
The memo
appeared shortly before trial. TR. at 1556, lines 23-25.
7

real fact question about the nature and existence of any sexual
dysfunction and the cause."

PL. at 1048

(Court's Decision)

(emphasis added); See also PL. at 1085 (Findings of Fact 515); PL.
at 1084 (Findings of Fact 511); PL. at 1085 (Findings of Fact 517),
at 1086 (Findings of Fact 5518, 19, 20 and 26); See also PL. at
1048 (Court's Decision).
The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations when
a plaintiff, despite the exercise of due diligence, is unable to
know of "the existence of an injury and its cause."

Hargett, 598

F. Supp. at 155; Christiansen, 436 P.2d at 436; Foil, 601 P.2d at
148.

In this case the discovery rule should toll the limitations

period because, under a proper interpretation of Foil, there was no
evidence that Jones knew that the surgery was the likely or
probable cause of his injury until September of 1987.
3.

The Foil Legal Injury Test Requires That A Plaintiff
Know Or Should Know The Possibility of Negligence.
The Trial Court found that Jones "knew or should have

known that he had sustained an injury and the causation of the
same, on or about May of 1984."

PL. at 1046 (Court's Decision).

The Trial Court erroneously found based on this knowledge, Jones
"had two years from May of 1984, the point of discovery, in which
to file an Intent to Commence Legal Action." PL. at 1047 (Court's
Decision).
Jones, contrary to Appellees' assertions, has never
argued a legal determination of negligence or expert medical
opinion of negligence is necessary to start the statute. Deschamps,
8

at 474. On the other hand, a plaintiff must be aware of facts from
which he reasonably should suspect "a possibility of negligence".
Haraett, at 155; Foil, 601 P.2d at 148; Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d
694, 696-97 (Utah 1980); Deschamps, at 474; See also Pope v. Gray,
760 P.2d 763, 764 (Nev. 1988); Massey, 669 P.2d at 249; Cleveland,
701 P.2d at 1306; Wehrman v. United States, 830 F.2d 1480, 1484
(8th Cir. 1987).

In other words, a plaintiff must be aware of

facts which reasonably indicate that something may have gone wrong
in the performance of the medical care; that is, some fact
indicating malpractice by the health care provider. Foil, 601 P.2d
at 148; Hove, 621 P.2d at 696; Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337 (Utah
1987);

See also Jones v. Salem Hospital, 762 P.2d 303, 313 (Or.

App. 1988); Jordan v. United States, 503 F.2d 620, 621, 623-24 (6th
Cir. 1974); Bridcrford v. United States, 550 F.2d 978, 982 (4th Cir.
1977); Rispoli v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (E.D.N.Y.
1983); Exnicious v. United States, 563 F.2d 418, 424-25 (10th Cir.
1977); Hamilton, 773 F.2d at 466.
However, "[a] surgical procedure is not malpractice
simply because it does 'not turn out as it was supposed to have. '"
DeWitt v. United States, 593 F.2d 276, 280 (7th Cir. 1979).
Therefore, even if Jones experienced a dysfunction

following

surgery, this does not ipso facto mean that he had reason to
believe it may have been caused by malpractice. Discovery of legal
injury encompasses both knowledge of injury and knowledge of the
possibility of negligence.

Foil, 601 P.2d at 144.

9

Appellees and the Trial Court discount and omit any
reference to the specific requirement that plaintiff have some
knowledge that the injury was possibly caused by negligence.

In

this case, no evidence was presented by Appellees, nor did the
Trial Court find that Jones had reason to know the injury he
sustained was possibly attributable to negligence on the part of
Appellees.
Court.

In fact, just the opposite was found by the Trial

In its factual findings, the Trial Court stated that Jones

was aware and was told by Dr. Becker that sexual dysfunction was
one of the foreseeable and possible results of the surgery. PL. at
1048.

This means that Jones was found to be aware that even a

properly performed surgery may have resulted in dysfunction. There
was no evidence presented that Jones was ever told or should have
known

that

the

surgery

may

have been

performed

improperly.

Therefore, Jones' awareness of injury and knowledge that it may
have been caused by the surgery are not tantamount to knowledge of
negligence as required by Foil.

See Hove, 621 P. 2d at 696-97;

Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 154-155; Deschamps, at 474; Brower, 744
P.2d at 1339; See also Cleveland, 701 P.2d at 1306; Wehrman, 830
F.2d at 1484; Prenderville v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 867, 868
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Jordan, 503 F.2d at 623.
The only evidence regarding knowledge of the possibility
of negligence was Jones7 testimony that Dr. Dayton reported to him
that the "most likely cause" of his sexual dysfunctions was that
"something went wrong during the surgeries". TR. at 1449 lines 1825, at 1450 lines 12-14 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones).
10
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IN C O N C L U D I N G T H A T THE CONTINUING TFF ATMENT
D O C T R I N E D O E S N O T APPLY Jr.- THIS CASJI .

THE

The

Trial

Court

continuing treatment
1 egi sJ atuI e passed

I:L 1 t:d

latter

(Court' s Decision) , PI ,, at ] 088

1 aw

t .hat t h e

nut. apt ! :% ab] e si nee 1 .he

ioctri ne -

§ ; 8- 1 i• 4,

•*f

,

^

a me,. i ^ . ) ,,, 31: L.

• at 111 052

( Conci us:i oris of Law f 6 ) ; and ( 2 )

that the doctrine would not apply to the facts of this case because
of Jones' knowledge of his injury and possible causes, and the
absence of any misleading conduct preventing Jones from obtaining
medical information as a result of the continuing treatment.

PL.

at 1088 (Conclusions of Law, 57). 3
In cases involving the application of a statute, the
primary objective is to determine the intent and purpose for which
it was enacted.

Young v. Barney, 433 P.2d 846, 847 (Utah, 1967).

Section 78-14-4 was enacted for the purpose of codifying the
discovery rule adopted in Christiansen. Christiansen, 436 P.2d at
436-37. The statute was designed to provide greater protection of
the public in cases of medical malpractice by extending or tolling
the statute of limitations according to the unigue facts in each
case.
Legislative

bodies

are

presumed

to

legislate

with

knowledge of judicial precedent. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
580-81 (1978). Where, as here, the legislature adopts a statute of
limitations against a background of existing law, a court should
not infer an intent to depart from that precedent absent some clear
legislative intent.

Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. United States, 874

F.2d 169, 172-73 (3rd Cir. 1989).

Therefore, "failure to make

changes in a given statute in a particular respect when the subject
3

Appellees' erroneously state that Jones did not cite Utah
authority in support of the continuing treatment doctrine and did
not argue the physician-patient relationship doctrine at trial.
Appellees Brief at 43, 45. Both of these issues were raised before
the trial court and are part of the record upon which the court
based its decision. TR. at 1723 line 25, at 1724 lines 1-10.
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Ny^i , fi Pi I' "ill ill n " illewn,

Jr., concurring); Mayer, 482 P.2d at 501-02; Yoshizaki v. Hilo
Hospital, 433 P.2d 220, 224 (Hawaii 1967).

1.

The Discovery Rule And The Continuing Treatment Doctrine Are
Consistent.
Courts considering the issue, have held that under the

discovery rule, statutes of limitation properly run from the end of
a period of continuous medical treatment.

Metzger v. Kalke, 709

P.2d 414, 417 (Wyo. 1985)(and cases cited therein).

In states

where the legislature has incorporated the discovery rule into a
statute of

limitations

for medical malpractice, their

Supreme

Courts recognize the continuing treatment doctrine as an exception
to

the

limitations

period.6

Federal

6

courts

interpreting

the

See e.g. , (1) California, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §340.5;
Hundley v. St. Francis Hospital, 327 P.2d 131, 135 (Cal. 1958);
Myers v. Stevenson, 270 P.2d 885, 886-87 (Cal. 1954); (2) Missouri,
V.A.M.S. Civ. Proc. & Limit. §516.105; Thatcher v. DeTar, 173
S.W.2d 760, 762 (1943); Shaw v. Clough, 597 S.W.2d 212, 214-15 (Mo.
App. 1980); Green v. Washington University Medical Center, 761
S.W.2d 688, 689-90 (Mo. App. 1988); (3) Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat.
Comm. & Limit, of Actions §25-222 (Reissue 1989); Williams v.
Elias, 1 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Neb. 1941); Smith v. Dewey, 335 N.W.2d
530, 533 (Neb. 1983); and (4) Wyoming, W.S. Limit, of Actions §1-3107(a); Metzger, 709 P.2d at 414; Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667,
669 (Wyo. 1988).
Appellees cite Bixler v. Bowman, 614 P.2d 1290 (Wash. 1980)
for the proposition that the continuing treatment doctrine is
inconsistent with the discovery rule.
The continuing treatment
rule in Washington was "affected only slightly" in Bixler, which
holds only that the doctor-patient relationship ends with the
patients' last visit with the doctor. The rule that the statute is
tolled during a continuing course of treatment endures.
Note,
Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations in Washington, 57 Wash.
L. Rev. 317, 329 (1982).
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_ , (t . j ^ a i n S t the United S t a t e s i s
barred "unless it .is presented to trie a p p r o p r i a t e FederaJ agency
within two y e a r s a f t e r such claim a c c r u e s . "
28 U.S.C. §2401(b).
Federal c o u r t s follow rhe discovery r u l e t o determine when a claim
accrues under * ::• fTCA
Perkins v. United S t a t e s , 76 F.R.D. 591,
8

S'ee, e . g . . Page v. United S t a t e s , 729 F.2d 818, 823n. 36 (D.C.
C i r . 1984); Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440
F. Supp. 1088, 1098 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Accardi v. United S t a t e s , 356
I5
Supp. 218 , 221 ( S . D. N. Y. 1973 ); Kossick v. United S t a t e s , 330
F.2d 933, 936 (2d C i r . 1 964); Kelly v. United S t a t e s , 554 F, Supp.
1001,
1003-04 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); M i l l e r v. United S t a t e s , 458 F.
Supp 363, 365-66 (D. Puerto Rico 1978); Otto v. National I n s t i t u t e
of Health, 815 F.2d 985, 988-89 (4th C i r . 1987); and Wehrman v.
United S t a t e s , 830 F 2d ] 480 1 i83 ( 8 1 h Ci r
1 987)
15

250; Comment, The Continuous Treatment Doctrine: A Toll on the
Statute of Limitations for Medical Malpractice in New York, 49
Albany L. Rev. 64, 68-69 (1984) (hereinafter "Comment"); Metz
709 P.2d at 417; Otto, 815 F.2d at 988.

r,

Contrary to the ^ lal

Court's conclusion, the doctrine applies to patients who hav
knowledge of the physician's negligent acts.

full

Kelly v. United

States, 554 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (E.D.N.Y 1983); Wehrman, 830 F.2d
at 1483; LaBay v. White Plains Hospital, 467 N.Y.S.2d 400, 401
(1983)

("The fact that [plaintiff]

*may have been aware of the

alleged tort and its results on the day of the fall did not deprive
[plaintiff] of the tolling protection of the continuous treatment
doctrine.")
The rationale for the continuous treatment doctrine rests
on a number of sound policy factors not completely addressed by
§78-14-4. First, equity dictates that a remedy be available where
the

negligent

acts of

the

health

care

provider

caused

the

lengthened treatment. Borgia v. City of New York, 187 N.E.2d 777,
779 (N.Y. 1962); Comment at p. 68-69. Additionally, a patient has
the right to place trust and confidence in his physician during the
period of treatment.

Peteler, 17 P.2d at 250; Williams, 1 N.W.2d

at 124; Otto, 815 F.2d at 988; Mortensen v. United States, 509 F.
Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Comment, at p. 69-70.

The physician

also has superior medical knowledge; therefore, the patient may
rely on his physician's expertise and training and accepts in good
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pi a c t i c e

11

occur led

2V_-Liij
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f_

rov. ,es

n

;? -

during

its

course, the statute of limitations begins to run when the tre' ment
terminates.

Williams, 1 N.W.2d at 124; Metzger, 709 P.2d a

Perhaps

the

most

compelling

reason

for

417.

co

nued

recognition of the doctrine in this case is that it gi

3 the

patient the right to rely upon the doctor's professior ^ skill
without

the

necessity

of

interrupting

treatment by instituting suit.

a

continuing

course

of

Peteler, 17 P.2d at 250; Borgia,

187 N.E.2d at 779; Holdridqe, 440 F. Supp. at 1098; Perkins, 76
F.R.D. at 592; Kelly, 554 F. Supp. at 1004; Grubbs v. Rawls, 369
S.E.2d

683,

686

(Va.

1988).

This

allows

the

patient

the

opportunity to seek corrective treatment as well as giving the
physician a reasonable chance to identify and correct any errors.
Williams, 1 N.W.2d at 124; Otto, 815 F.2d at 988; Grubbs, 369
S.E.2d at 686; Whitmore v. Fabi, 399 N.W.2d 520, 523-24 (Mich. App.
1986) .
Based

on

these

sound

principles,

recognize the continuing treatment doctrine
viable exception to §78-14-4.

this

Court

should

as a valuable

and

Further, the evidence in the record

illustrates the necessity of continued recognition of the doctrine.
There is abundant testimony that Jones engaged in a lengthy and
continuing

program

of

care

and

treatment

for

his

Appellees from December, 1983 through January, 1987.

disease

by

TR. at 1557

lines 18-21, at 1590 line 25, at 1591 line 1 (testimony of Terri
Stoker);
lines 1-10

TR. at 1167 lines 23-25, at 1168 lines 1-25, at 1169
(testimony of Dr. Dayton); TR. at 1410 lines 2-7, at
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1181 line

lines
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t o the operations and foJ low-up ziare,
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at
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TR. a t

23-25,

•i i r i-cM y r e l a t e d

TR.
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III- 1 i I <j!/il- i muiiy

nes*
ir

i4il

1 -I I I! I ni in '.-,

Jones);
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,it
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lf
a t
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IUHI

Dr , Becher
extend ing

Becker J ef I : the Uu Lvei s i t y H i)spit a l .
at

I 44]

1 1 ne

1

( statement

of

Mr.

Williams).

J o n e s ' continued can e b} Dr

Becker w a s necessary because

of Dr. Becker 's unique medical expertise I n performing the i leoanal
procedure.

Statement « :)f Facts Nc >

1182 1 ines

1 -5 , 20 -25 , at 1 ] 83 1 ines

Becker);
Beckei

1; TI il : I: , ]l II 8]| Il :i i les ] 8 2:2
1- 16

(testimony

a, 1:

of Dr.

TR. at; 117f:> lines 20-21 (testimony of Dr, Becker) . I )r.

w d s I h e i >n I y | iliyi;; i c t a n

i mi I In ' i u l t . I n t u u n l a i n . M thi pi 'i f < »i JIII HI iityj

the xieoana I surgical procedure o n adu its when J ones was < iperat ed
on :i n 1 9 8 4 , Statement of Facts No

1

If Jones needed someone

and care, he would have held 1: : travel out o f the intermountain
region
opi ned

TR ] 256 1 i nes 2-l» (testimony of Dr, Rerkei i
that

] c -ne s

si i i: ye i y

iin i h 11 1111' i mi|

Dr Becker

m i i • i equ i r ed the

expertise of someone such as himsell, because oii the complexity and
rari ty of t h e d isease.
(testi iiiony c f E

TR. .it iu. ' lines 14-17,

Be< ::keii ) ( 'I I

il ) : b t i I J IIUJJ

19

it 125H lines 1-4

M • , I ) , . i t ; .I2! 1 HI 1 i n s

8-13 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1256 lines 17-23 (testimony
of Dr. Becker).

In fact, Dr. Becker testified that it would have

been unreasonable for Jones to seek post-surgical follow up care
somewhere else.

TR. at 1259 lines 23-25, at 1260 lines 1-19

(testimony of Dr. Becker).
Based on these facts, even assuming Jones knew of the
possibility of negligence in 1984, he had virtually no alternative
but to continue treatment and care with Appellees until the
treatment

was

concluded

in

1987.

According

to Appellees'

interpretation of the statute, the limitations period in this case
would have run over a year before Jones stopped seeing Dr. Becker.
Under such circumstances, "[i]t would be absurd to require a
wronged patient to interrupt corrective efforts by serving a
summons on the physician. . . . "

Borgia, 187 N.E.2d at 779.

See

also Otto, 815 F.2d at 988-89. Obvious injustice would result from
requiring Jones to disrupt his exclusive and complex medical
treatment that would, and in fact did result from initiating suit.
TR. 1451 lines 22-25, at 1452 lines 1-19 (testimony of G. Kevin
Jones).
According to the stipulated facts, Dr. Becker's last act
as Jones' physician occurred in January, 1987. Accordingly, Jones
had until January, 1989, to file his action. It is undisputed that
Notice of Intent to Commence Action was filed on December 4, 1987,
well within the statutory period.
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The changing field of medical practice in the United
States requires recognition of the continuing treatment doctrine.
The

application

of the

discovery

rule without

the

continuing

treatment exception is unrealistic and inconsistent with modern
medicine.4

Jones' complex course of treatment is an example of

the many patients who are dependent upon one "sub-specialist" for
their entire course of treatment.

It would be absurd to require a

patient to sue that physician before that specialized, necessary
treatment had ended.

Such a requirement would ironically preserve

the cause of action but, at the same instant, would foreclose the
patient's only available means of medical recovery.

Accordingly,

this Court should uphold the continuing treatment doctrine as a
consistent exception to §78-14-4.

See, e.g., Brigance v. Velvet

Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725 P.2d 300, 303-04 (Okl. 1986); Ontiveros
v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 208-09 (Ariz. 1983).
C.

EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT EXCEPTION
TO THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD.
In Myers the Utah

Supreme

Court

recognized

that

in

"exceptional circumstances or causes of action" the statute of
limitations

should

be

"irrational or unjust."

tolled

where

its

application

Myers, 635 P.2d at 86.

would

be

When injustice

A recent report by The Journal of the American Medical
Association concludes that "The environment of medical practice is
changing more rapidly than ever before.
Growth of medical
knowledge and changes in the way medicine is practiced are
producing an explosion of new sub-specialties. . . . " The Journal
of the American Medical Association, Vol. 268, No. 9 (Sept. 2,
1992) at p. 1105.
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would occur, courts may properly fashion an equitable exception to
the statutory period.
1968);

Peteler,

17

Klamm Shell v. Berg, 441 P.2d 10, 13 (Colo.
P.2d

at

250; Myers,

635

P.2d

at

87-88;

Christiansen, 436 P.2d at 436-37; Foil, 601 P.2d at 147-48; Burnett
v. New York Central Railroad Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428

(1965)(The

policy underlying the statute of limitations may be outweighed
"where

the

interests

of

plaintiff's rights.").

justice

require

vindication

of

the

It is the basic and fundamental duty of

this Court "to aid the furtherance of justice and (ensure) that
every litigant shall be permitted to enjoy his day in court."
Sewell v. Beatrice Foods Co., 400 P.2d

892, 894

(Mont. 1965);

Myers, 635 P.2d at 88 (Howe, Jr., concurring).
To determine whether equity should toll the limitations
period, the Court in Myers utilized a balancing test stating,
"[t]he hardship the statute of limitations would impose on the
plaintiff

[was to

be balanced

against]

any

prejudice

to

the

defendant from difficulties of proof caused by the passage of
time."

Myers,

635

P. 2d

at

87.

The

Court

in

Myers

found

"exceptional circumstances" to be present where the guardians did
not discover the wrongful death of their ward until after the
statute of limitations had run.
problems of proof

The Court also noted that the

caused by the delay were not
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significantly

different for the defendant than for the plaintiffs.

Myers, 635

P.2d at 87. 5
In

this

case,

the

policy

against

stale

claims

outweighed by the unique circumstances of Jones' hardship
medical condition.

is
and

Appellees cannot establish that they would be

prejudiced by having to defend Jones' claim since their problems of
proof occasioned by the delay are no greater than Jones'.

Cf.

Myers, 635 P.2d at 87.
In contrast, Jones would be irreparably prejudiced if he
were expected to file an action while still undergoing continued
medical treatment from the only physician in the intermountain area
trained to treat him.

Equity demands Jones be allowed to bring his

action after treatment by Dr. Becker concluded.
After applying the balancing test, Jones would be left
without a legal remedy after completion of his course of treatment.
If Jones

is

"denied the opportunity

of proceeding with

[his]

action, the law would be in the untenable position of having
created a remedy for [Jones] and then barring [him] from exercising
it before [he] had any practical opportunity to do so." Myers, 635
P.2d at 87.

See also Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter International,

5

The governing policy in the area of the statute of
limitations, as declared by the Utah Supreme Court, "is that
statutes of limitations 'are designed to promote justice by
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.'"
Myers, 635 P.2d at 86
quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
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694 P.2d 143, 147 (Alaska 1984) (citing Myers); Foil, 601 P.2d at
147.

Even assuming Jones knew of a legal injury, equity should

permit the statutory period to be tolled until conclusion of
treatment by Dr. Becker.

Jones' actions should not be barrec oy

the technical application of §78-14-4 when such obvious injustice
would result.
CONCLUSION
Jones has shown that even assuming the Trial Court's
Findings of Fact are grounded in evidence, there was no evidence
offered that Jones knew or had reason to know of the possibility of
negligence prior to September of 1987. The Trial Court failed to
properly apply the requirements of knowledge of "legal injury" as
required by Foil and its progeny, mandating reversal of the
judgment.
This Court should also continue recognition of Peteler
and the continuing treatment doctrine as an exception to the
statute. Under the unique facts of this case, rigid application of
the statute of limitations in this case would unreasonably require
Jones to choose between continued, life-saving medical treatment
and his legal remedy. The continuing treatment doctrine offers an
equitable solution to the conflict by permitting essential medical
treatment to continue and by preserving legal rights.
Finally, compelling circumstances exist to warrant an
exception to the inflexible interpretation of §78-14-4 proposed by
Appellees.

There is no greater prejudice to Appellees than to
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Jones in permitting equitable tolling of the statute pending
completion of medical treatment by Dr. Becker.

This Court may

properly vacate the judgment and remand this matter to the Trial
Court for retrial of the merits of this case under Foil and
Peteler.
Respectfully submitted this2L8£JL day of OCTOBER, 1992.
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